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SHIPPING COMBINATIONS AS SEEN 
FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF 
FREIGHT THEORYl) 
1. FALL OF FREIGHT RATES UNDER 
COMPETITION. 
The shipping enterprise is comparatively easy to be under 
taken chiefly because of the foUowing two reasons: in the 
first place, its field of business is the sea which is free from 
natural obstacles and legal interference; and secondly, much 
smaUer capital is needed as compared with other enterprises, 
railway enterprise, for example. In time of business pros-
perity, therefore, new shipping enterprises are easily un-
dertaken, while existing enterprises are also expanded, the 
amount of shipping tonnage thereby being increased. 
The capital invested in a shipping enterprise is fixed in 
the form of vessels, and cannot, in ordinary circumstances, 
be transformed. However, since a vessel is a commodity 
in the international market, a shipping entrepreneur can 
seU whatever vessel he owns if he so desires, and thus 
withdraw his investment. But even then the vessel itself 
remains in esse as a vessel, unless it is dismantled. Thus, 
once the capital of a society is invested in a shipping 
enterprise, it is not likely to be transferred to any other 
industry. 
Let us see what aU this means under competition. In 
the first place, a competition is easily commenced, because, 
as has, been already pointed out, anyone can start this 
enterprise, thereby causing a new competition. He can also 
1) By "Freight theory" I mean the theory of freight charges and the 
phrase is used in this sense all.,through. 
" 
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intensify the existing competition by participating in it. 
In the second place, since the capital invested in the ship· 
ping enterprise is fixed in the form of vessels, it is rather 
difficult for those who have once entered into the com· 
petition to get out of it, contrary to the ease of entering 
it. Moreover even though the ownership of a vessel should 
change, the vessel itself remains only to earn freight 
charges. These undoubtedly indicate that the enterprise 
lacks the flexibility which enables an industry automatically 
to alleviate competition. Thus, the competition in the ship· 
ping industry is a free competition only in reference to its 
commencement, or to the participation of shipowners in it; 
it is a restricted form of competiton so far as the freedom 
of withdrawal therefrom is concerned. 
Another restriction on competition in the shipping in· 
dustry is found in the fact that a considerable expenditure 
is needed for the maintenance of the business capital, the 
vessels, even during the cessation of operations. Even 
when vessels are laid up in harbour instead of being used 
in active service, owners must payout considerable sums 
merely for maintenance. Such expenses mean only loss for 
the owners. When, therefore, the owners of vessels lose 
because of keen competition, if that loss is less than the 
cost of laying·up the vessels, the owners will choose to 
continue the active operation of their bottoms. 
They will withdraw their vessels from a market only 
after the market freight rate falls below a point at which 
the loss from competitive navigation and the cost of laying· 
up that vessel fairly balance each other. Such a point 
of freight rate I call the "laying-up point," because when 
the market freight rate falls below it the vessel is, to speak 
logically, laid up. 
As the "laying-up point" has an important meaning 
for the freight theory, I shall take this opportunity to 
elucidate it. Suppose x represents the market freight rate 
per ton, for instance, for a given trip, c represents the cost 
of the marine service of a vessel for a transportation unit 
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(one ton for instance), and 1 represents "the laying-up cost 
of that vessel for the. same unit, then the laying-up point 
of that vessel is the x which stands in the following equa-
tion:-
c-x=l 
Thus, even when the supply of tonnage greatly exceeds 
demand and the freight rate is below the cost of the 
marine service, unless the laying-up point is reached, the 
owners will continue to operate their vessels under the 
strained competition; and it is only after the laying-up 
point has been reached that the vessels will be withdrawn 
from the field_ 
Looked at from the standpoint of freight theory, 
we should clearly distinguish the three meanings of the 
"excess of tonnage-supply_" The first meaning indicates a 
case where the supply of tonnage exceeds the demand at 
a given freight rate_ This is the usual meaning of excess 
of tonnage-supply_ Secondly, when supply exceeds demand, 
supposing al1 vessels demand a freight rate which is over 
and above the cost of the marine service_ Thirdly, when 
supply exceeds demand, supposing all vessels demand a 
freight rate which is over and above the laying-up points_ 
The second and third meanings are extraordinary develop-
ments of the first 
It is clear then that the freight rate is lowest when the 
supply of tonnage exceeds the demand in the third meaning_ 
In that case, as the supply of tonnage exceeds the demand 
should al1 the vessels demand freight rates which are 
higher than their respective laying-up points, those vessels 
the laying-up points of which are comparatively high will 
be eliminated from the field of competition; they will be 
driven out of the business by those other vessels the 
laying-up points of which are comparatively low_ In con-
sequence, the market freight rate will be determined at the 
laying-up point of the vessel which is at the margin of 
actual tonnage-supply, viz_, it will be determined at the 
highest laying-up point of a vessel remaining in actual 
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service. In the tramp business this is the general limit of 
the freight rate reduced by competition. 
If we should take individual vessels under any freight 
rate, we shall find that that freight rate is for some vessel 
higher than the cost. of its marine service; while for others 
it is lower than that; and again among those for whom 
that freight rate is lower than the cost of their respective 
marine services, it is for some vessels higher than their 
laying-up point, and for others lower than that. For the 
last-mentioned vessels transportation of freight at that rate 
means a greater loss than being laid-up, and they will 
withdraw from the field of supply. But in the case of a 
vessel the cost of marine service of which is higher, and 
the laying-up point is lower, than that freight rate, its loss 
from remaining in active marine service is a smaller loss 
than it would incur by laying-up in harbour; and as 11 
result it is likely to continue in operation although that also 
means a loss. Such being the case, in a marine market, 
where the excess of tonnage-supply in the third meaning 
already mentioned occurs, the market freight rate, viz., the 
freight rate at which the surplus tonnage is eliminated and 
thereby the tonnage-supply becomes equated to the demand, 
is nothing more or less than the laying-up point of a vessel 
which is just at the margin of actual supply in that case. 
On next page I use a figure to show what I have 
already pointed out. On that figure, prices, i. e., freight 
rates, are measured along the perpendicular axis 0 Y ; 
quantities, i. e., tonnages, are measured on the horizontal axis 
o X, as in the usual illustration of the value theory. Let 
it be supposed that the length of 0 e on the horizontal line 
represents the amount of vessels' tonnage in a given shipping 
market, and the lengths of lines parallel to it represent the 
amounts of tonnage demanded or supplied at various freight 
rates. Then we can take the curve D D' as a demand 
curve which shows a series of tonnage demanded at various 
freight rates. The curve C C' represents a series of the 
costs of marine set;vice for a transportation unit (one ton 
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for instance) of various vessels which stand in order on the 
line 0 X. The curve R R' represents a series 0f freight 
rates at the laying-up points for a transportation unit of 
those vessels. If shipowners do not consent to transport at 
p' 
r' ____ --: __ 
C' .J,.."'-1------1 g --: 
I 
o l).. b c e 
D' 
a rate cheaper than 
the cost of marine 
service, the supply 
curve in case of the 
over·supply of ton· 
nage should be the 
curve C C'. How-
ever, as has been 
already stated, ship· 
owners, in case of 
over·supply, rather 
willingly transport 
even if the rate is 
lower than the cost 
Fig. 1 
of marine service, 
provided it is not below the laying·up point of their vessels. 
For this reason, in case of the over·supply of tonnage in 
the third meaning already stated, the supply curve is not 
C C' but R R'; and in consequence, the curve R R' in such 
a case represents a series of laying·up points as well as 
that of freight rates at which the shipowners are willing 
to transport. 
In a shipping market where the relation between supply 
and demand is as shown in the above figure, the market 
freight rate is fixed at r. Of 0 e, representing the total 
existing tonnage in that market, the vessels represent-
ed by 0 c are employed in the marine service, while the 
vessels represented by c e are laid up and are thus thrown 
out of the field of actual supply. Of the vessels represent· 
ed by 0 c, which means the actual supply in this case, the 
vessels represented by 0 a are operated for a rate over and 
above the cost of operation and thus get a profit; while 
the vessels represented bl( a c are used for a rate cheaper 
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than the cost of operation and thus result in a loss. On 
the other hand, let us suppose that the amount of vessels' 
tonnage in the' given market were 0 b instead of 0 e, 
then the freight rate would be fixed at p showing a balance 
between supply and demand, and thus would correspond to 
the cost of the marine service of a vessel which stands at 
the margin of actual supply. In consequence, the vessels 
represented by a b should not have to be operated at a rate 
cheaper than the cost of operation, and aU vessels except 
that which is at b, the margin of supply, would derive 
some profit. Not only that, but the vessels represented by 
o a ought to derive a greater profit than that which they 
would have derived had 0 e been the total tonnage. In 
our case, however, since the total amount of tonnage is 
o e, instead of 0 b, the following things will happen: the 
vessels represented by 0 b being exposed to the competition 
of the vessels represented by b e, the freight rate finds itself 
at r, and only those vessels represented by c e are laid up, 
the vessels represented by b c are exempt from laying-up 
and are operated at a rate cheaper than the cost; but those 
represented by a b are oPerated in this case at a loss, and the 
profit of the vessels represented by 0 a will be reduced. 
Thus, under the foregoing circumstances, the market 
freight rate will be fixed at r; and, so long as the demand 
for marine service does not increase, or, in other words, 
so long as cargoes do not increase, the rate in question wi1I 
not rise above the point r. In consequence, should the con-
dition of the demand remain ~ unimproved, the loss from 
the operation of the vessels represented by a c is increased 
with the lapse of time, while the cost of laying-up of the 
vessels represented by c e is also increased. Hence, some 
of the owners of those vessels-both a c and c e-may have 
to dismantle their vessels because of the lack of the financial 
power to carry on. When dismantled vessels are less than 
c e, the freight rate will not rise above the point r; it is 
only after they become more than c e, that is, the total 
amount of tonnage in the market becomes less than 0 c, 
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that the freight rate rises above the point r; and if dis-
mantled vessels are .still on the increase, their number be-
coming b e, thereby making the total tonnage in the market 
o b, the freight rate will become the same as the cost of 
the marine service of the vessels at the point of marginal 
. supply, and thus reaches the profit-yielding point again. All 
this shows that in the shipping industry, if a business 
depression continues to exist, the freight rate at the end 
will be restored to the profit-yielding point, through the 
automatical reduction of supply, even though the circum-
stances controlling demand are not improved, because shipping 
entrepreneurs like any other entrepreneurs will not continue 
business at a loss for an unlimited length of time. 
However, there is a tendency in the shipping industry 
to check this automatic reduction of supply. In this in-
dustry it is very difficult to forecast its future business 
condition, as this is often changed by unexpected or 
suddenly happening events. This difficulty further makes it 
almost impossible to tell which of the following losses will 
be greater: 
1. Loss from immediate sale or dismantling of vessels. 
2_ Loss from continuing the operation of vessels until 
business improves, when the continuation of operation incurs 
a loss less than the cost of laying them up. 
3_ Loss from continuing the laying-up of vessels until 
business picks up again, when laying-up incurs a loss less 
than the operating cost. 
Because of this difficulty, shipowners continue to operate 
their vessels as long as their capital permits, anticipating 
future prosperity, and thus the recovering tendency of the 
freight rate through the automatic limitation upon the 
. amount of supply in the shipping market being checked. 
Moreover, as those vessels, which are laid up as the result 
of the fall of the freight rate, are out of the field of supply 
only so far as their relation to the freight rate is concerned, 
they constitute the potential supply existing behind the 
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above their laying-up points, they return to the field of 
actual supply, thereby preventing a rise in the rate. 
As I have already pointed out, although the freight 
rate tends to recover, through the automatic reduction in 
supply, to a POint equal to the cost of marine service when 
it is long under that point; this recovery in actuality comes 
only after many shipping concerns have been driven out of 
the business, and after those who persist in remaining in 
the shipping world have suffered greatly. For this reason, 
shipping men cannot long engage in business under unrest-
ricted competition when the supply in the shipping market 
greatly exceeds the demand; and they attempt to meet the 
situation by an artificial control of the freight rate for the 
purpose of protecting their business as wen as their capital. 
This necessity has given rise among tramp-owners to com-
binations for the purpose of laying-up vessels, and among 
liner companies combinations for the purpose of monopoliz-
ing a trade route, and these latter are usually referred to 
as shipping "conferences." 
I 
2. COMBINATIONS OF TRAMP-OWNERS FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF LAYING UP VESSELS. 
Owners of tramps make a combination in case of over-
supply in the shipping world. The object of this combina-
tion is to lay up vessels at the expense of the combination, 
for the purpose of raising the freight rate to the profit-
yielding point by limiting tonnage and maintaining the 
newly reached rate. For this reason, the possibility of the 
organization of such a combination depends upon whether 
or not the profit from raising the rate will pay the expense 
of laying up vessels, an expense which is to be borne by 
the combination . 
.I shall explain the functions of this combination by 
figure 2 which is drawn up with the same conditions as 
in figure 1. When in a given shipping· market, over-
supply has caused the freight rate to go down to the 
• 
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laying-up point of a vessel which is at the margin of supply, 
-that laying-up point is represented in the figure by r-, 
tramp-owners combine for the purpose of raising the freight 
rate to the profit-yielding point p, by laying up the vessels 
represented by b c and c d, thereby reducing the amount 
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c d are laid up vol-
untarily by their 
owners when the 
freight rate is at 
the point r, but 
reappear as com-
petitors in the mar-
ket as soon as the 
rate is raised to the 
point p)_ The ves-
sels laid up (b c + 
c d) are to be given 
an allowance repre-
sented by psr plf out 
Fig. 2 of the total profit of 
p p' r' rlf 'which is derived by the operation of the vessels repre-
sented by 0 b. Thus, the tonnage represented by 0 b derives 
a net profit which is equal to p p' r' rlf minus p s r plf on the 
one hand, and enables the shipowners of the vessels represented 
by b c and c d, on the other hand, to lay up these vessels 
by giving them a subsidy the amount of which is deter-
mined by the difference between the p freight rate and the 
laying-up points of the freight rates of the respective vessels, 
the average quantity of cargo carriage of each vessel in 
ordinary times being taken in consideration. 
The vessel at the point b receives the entire allowance 
for laying up, so that neither gain nor loss will be incurred 
whether that vessel is laid up or operated in actual service. 
Those vessels between band d receive a part of the laying- . 
up expense as subsidies, so that the loss from their opera-
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(The vessels between d and e are not entitled to be com-
petitors even when the freight rate is raised to the point p, 
because it is stilI below the laying-up point of those vessels; 
and, in consequence, are naturally excluded from the organiza-
tion of the combination.) If the owners of the vessels be· 
tween b c and c d should refuse to participate in a com· 
bination, and continue to operate their' vessels under 
unrestricted competition, the market freight rate would be 
by circumstance fixed at the point r, and the vessels be-
tween c d would be laid up bearing the entire expense by 
themselves; and the vessels between b c would be operated 
at a loss equal to the difference between the lines C C' and 
r r". But by the organization of the combination, the laying· 
up expense of vessels between c d will be reduced by the 
difference between the lines p" p and R R', while the loss 
of the owners of the vessels between b c will also be reo 
duced by the difference between the lines p" p and r r" ; 
and thus they are much better off than under unrestricted 
competition. The vessels between a b, which under com· 
petition must operate with a loss equivalent to the difference 
C C' and r r", will be enabled to derive, by constituting 
the combination, a profit equal to the difference between 
p p' and C C'. The vessels between 0 a get under com· 
petition only a profit which is equal to the difference be· 
tween r" r' and C C'; but after a combination has been 
formed, their profit will be increased by an amount equal to 
the difference between p p' and r" r'. Thus the combina· 
tion is in the situation to require the owners of the vessels 
represented by 0 a and a b to pay a part of the profit which 
they derive from participating in the combination (the total 
amount being expressed by p p' r r") as laying·up fund (the 
entire amount being expressed by p s r p") for the owners cif 
the vessels represented by b c and c d. In this way, the 
combjnation can restrict the amount of supply in the shipping 
market to 0 b, and maintain the freight rate at the 
profit·yielding point p. 
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consists in the possibility of limiting the tonnage-supply by 
using a part of the profit of some of its members to com-
pensate the laying-up expenses of other members, and in 
that of maintaining the freight rate at the profit-yielding 
point, thereby enabling the vessels operated to derive some 
profit, on the one hand, and reducing the loss of laying-up 
vessels on the other. Viewed from the standpoint of a 
freight theory, the formation and existence of such a com-
bination is possible only when the amount of profits (p p' r' 
r") of the vessels operating is greater than the amount of 
the subsidies (p s r p") for the laid-up vessels. If it is 
necessary to lay up a greater number of vessels, to maintain 
the freight rate at the profit-yielding point, and censequent· 
Iy the amount of subsidies for the laid-up vessels (p s r p") 
grows larger than the total amount of the profits (p p' r' r") 
of the vessels in operation, there is no possibility of the 
existence of such a trampowners' combination. 
The foregoing combination is by far the most logical 
as well the most rational of such measures. The vessels 
included in the combination are lined up in order of their ~ 
laying-up points, those having the greatest laying-up points 
being first laid up. This enables the combination to give 
the least possible subsidies as a whole, for laying-up 
vessels, and the vessels operated to yield the maximum 
profit. Of this scheme, therefore, we can see the greatest 
possibility of the formation and of the continued existence 
of such a combination; for unless the vessels are laid up 
according to their laying-up points, the greatest being first 
laid up, and so on in order, the laying-up subsidies of the 
combination will be greater and the profit of the vessels in 
operation will be less. If so, even though a combination be 
formed, the possibility of its continued existence becomes 
logically, so to say, smaller. 
However, in actual practice, other considerations play 
an important role in determining the system of a corpbina-
tion. As I have already stated, the laying-up point being 
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the same as the laying-up expense, it differs with every 
vessel. The laying-up point of a vessel-is, therefore, related 
both to the cost of its marine service and its laying-up 
expense. But, as a matter of fact, shipping companies 
want to conceal both the costs of the marine service and 
the laying-up expenses of their own vessels, because if these 
are known to their competitors they would be in a dis-
advantageous position. As the combination of the sort above 
mentioned is usually established in urgent need at tbe time 
of a great business depression when there is an over-supply 
of tonnage even at the laying-up freight rate, the combina-
tion is dissolved when the business gets a little lively and 
the freight rate becomes greater than the laying-up point 
even though it be below the cost of the marine service. 
When, therefore, shipping concerns put an end to competi-
tion by means of such a combination, they consider their 
own positions in the ship,Jing market when it has been im-
proved, and the combination has been dissolved, and refuse 
to notify the costs of the marine services and the laying'uP 
expenses of their own vessels to the combination. If such 
a notification is insisted upon, for the purpose of establish-
ing an effective combination logically devised as above 
stated, the opposition of shipowners will not allow its 
establishment. 
In actual practice, the combination lays up vessels of 
the members at a certain percentage, instead of following 
the logical method just referred to. For this reason, some 
of the vessels laid up have lower layillg-up points than 
those which are operated. The consequence of this has 
been already pointed out. 
A combination for the purpose of suspending the oper:a-
tion of vessels in turn with the vessels of different com-
panies for a certain period of time, involves a greater 
expense than a percentage laying-up combination, and, in 
consequence, the possibility of its continuous existence is 
less than that of the latter system. . 
But aside from the theoretical difficulty I have already 
• 
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pointed out, there is another practical difficulty which we 
must not overlook. This difficulty is bound up with the very 
nature of the tramp shipping enterprise. As tramp vessels 
do not operate in one trade route alone but go wherever a 
good freight rate can be obtained, those which are operating 
in unprofitabe conditions go to any shipping market where a 
better rate is maintained through the establishment of a 
combination, and thus become new competitors against the 
members of the combination. This results in making the 
combination ineffective in limiting the supply of tonnage, 
bringing about a lowering of the freight rate below the 
profit·yielding point, and a reduction in the amount of freight 
profit of the members (p p' r' r"), so that the combination 
will be unable to afford the laying·up subsidies (p s r p"). 
This difficulty can never be avoided in actual practice. 
It is clear then that the establishment of a combination 
among tramp-owners is possible only when a certain ship· 
ping market is totally isolated from the other shipping 
markets of the world, or is intended ·only for so brief a period 
as no new competitor enters that market. A general and 
lasting combination will be impossible unless all the tramp· 
owners of the world join in and establish a single combina· 
tion. 
3. COMBINATIONS OF LINER COMPANIES 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF MONOPOLIZING 
A TRADE ROUTE,-"SHIPPING CONFERENCES." 
We have seen that, vieWEd from the standpoint of a 
freight theory, the possibility of organizing a combination 
of tramp·owners for the purpose of laying'up vessels is 
greatly limited; and that, therefore, it is very difficult for 
tramp-owners to control the freight rate by artificial means 
in times of business depression. However, it is only seldom 
that a great depression in the shipping world continues for 
a very long period of time, and, as a corollary, it is· also 
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compels the establishment of a combination for the purpose 
of laying-up vessels. Moreover, in the tramp business there 
are frequent changes in the tone of the market even dur-
ing a time of depression, and also seasonal fluctuations, 
due chiefly to the transportation of agricultural and forestry 
products. For this reason tramp-owners very seldom feel 
the necessity of stopping their business for a long time, 
though they may have to lay up their vessels temporarily. 
In the majority of cases, the laying-up of vessels in tramp 
shipping is at most a temporary convenience and does not 
mean for a minute a business collapse . 
But all this is totally different in the case of the liner 
business, in which, not only a general business depression 
resulting in a great decrease in the demand for shipping 
stimulates a sharp competition for the securing of cargo,s, 
but also the appearance of new competitors at any tine 
results in a struggle for the .securing of trade routes_ In 
either of the two cases, it is impossible for liner companies, 
by the very nature of their business, to withdraw their 
vessels from the line and lay them up, for the purpose of 
a temporary discontinuance of business, even though the 
freight rate should drop below the laying-up point. For, as 
the liner COMpany has its business field in a certain trade 
route, if vessels are withdrawn from that route, the patron-
age which the company has secured through its efforts 
extending for many years, will be snatched away by some 
rival, resulting in the total loss of its investment; and 
double the capital and the most strenuous efforts may not 
avail to drive out the rival from the field in the future. 
Thus, in the liner business, investment is made rather 
upon the trade route than upon vessels, consequently, even 
when it is better for a company to lay up vessels than run 
them, it cannot do so even for a temporary purpose because 
of the fear of losing that trade route. Liner-companies are 
thus not free to fix their loss at a certain point as in the. 
case of tramp-owners by laying up their vessels, and, be 
exempt from a greater loss under competition. As a result, 
• 
\ 
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the laying-up point in the freight rate has no significance 
for liners so far as their mutual .competition is concerned. 
But since the laying-up point is the minimum freiglit rate 
for tramps, it can be regarded as the minimum rate for 
cargoes which are the object of both tramps and liners. In 
the competition for liner-cargoes, no matter how keen it 
may be, the liner companies must stay in that competition 
so long as their capital will allow them. This is why the 
freight rate of a liner sometimes drops to -a ridiculously 
low point. . 
It is only natural then that, under unrestricted com-
petition, liner companies' losses accumulate faster than in 
the case of tramp-owners and bankruptcy appears more 
speedily on the horizon. The risk of the enterprise is 
greater in the liner business than in the tramp business. 
Liner companies with smail. capital are either forced out 
of the shipping world or compelled to amalgamate with a 
bigger company. Even companies with big capital seek a 
method of limiting reckless competition because of their 
fear of its dreadful consequences. In the liner enterprise 
competition naturally results in a mutual compromise and 
a consequent establishment of combinations. 
There are two main reasons for the establishment of 
combinat;ons in the case of liners. In the first place, 
natural competition must be regulated; and secondly, com-
panies must be prepared for losses in times of business 
depression when the freight rate is liable to go down even 
below the laying-up point. Even when there is no com-
petition among liner companies necessitating the lowering 
of rates, they should provide for a general business dep-
ression accompanying a wholesale reduction in the amount 
of cargoes; and, as has been already said, the liner com-
panies cannot lay up their vessels even in such a time. 
The loss of .the liner companies sustained during general 
business depression should be, as in all other industries, 
retrieved by the profit made during a subsequent prosperous 
period. But this will be difficult for liner companies, be-
< 
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cause they should expect the appearance of new com-
petitors who will disturb the peace of the shipping world. 
If, therefore, the liner companies wish to make up the loss 
referred to, they should successfully prevent the entry of 
new competitors into their field_ 
The one effective method which is often resorted to by 
liner companies is to tie customers, that is, shippers, to 
their business, and the typical example of this method is 
what is known as the deferred rebate system. But if this 
method is to be effective in excluding others, all liner 
companies engaged in the same trade route should adopt it 
conjointly. If this is not done, not only will the companies 
be unable to prevent the entry of new companies into their 
sphere of influence, so to say, but the competition still alive 
between those who have and those who have not adopted 
the method above mentioned, will work infinite harm to 
both sides, and none of them will be able to make up for 
their losses. Thus liner companies are under the necessity 
of establishing combinations also because of the need of 
adopting conjointly some method of tying up the customers 
to their business to make up in time of prosperity the losses 
incurred during the depression. 
Because of those two reasons, the liner companies on the 
same trade route establish a combination, that is, a cartel 
generally known in the shipping world as a "conference." 
When a conference has been established, the liner 
companies participating in it regulate their mutual com-
petition, and thereby will be in a position where their 
freight-charging-policy will not be affected in a competitive 
way by other companies so far as the liner-cargoes are 
concerned, because they can successfully prevent competitors 
from entering into their own sphere of influence. In con--
sequence, the freight rates are determined according to 
"what the traffic will bear," and some of the cargoes which 
cannot bear a heavy rate are carried at a rate even lower 
than the cost of the marine service, while others are 
transported at a .rate higher than that cost, the whole 
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purpose being to carry as much cargo as possible and to 
derive as much profit as possible. Thus even during a 
business depression, as cargoes are carried at rates which 
are determined according to what shippers are willing to pay, 
all conference-vessels are operated as advantageously as 
possible in the circumstances. 
I shall explain what happens under this combination by 
means of a figure, which is similar to the foregoing two 
figures. 0 e on the line 0 X represents the entire tonnage 
under a conference, while the curve D D' represents a series 
of cO'relationships between the quantities of various cargoes 
on the route and their freight·charge·bearing capacities, i. e., 






through mutual agree· 
ment fix the freight 
rates . of cargoes by 
considering" what the 
traffic will bear." Or, 
in other words, the 
members demand as 
rates what is repre-
sented by the curve 
D D'. Thus all of the 
vessels of the con-
, ference, the tonnage 
oi e X of which is represent-
Fig. 3 ed by 0 e, are supplied 
for the demand of transportation so that there shall be no 
excess vessels. The total loss borne by the entire members 
(C p Dill is retrieved by the profit of the entire members 
(D p C'l. 
There is no doubt that the shape of the curve D D' in 
times of business prosperity is greatly different from that 
of a similar curve in times of depression. D p in the curve 
D IY in times of depression will be much shorter than the 
corresponding part of the same curve in times of prosperity. 
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tramps depriving the liners of some part of the cargoes 
represented by this D p, a sudden drop near the point p 
may occur, the consequence being that D p C' becomes 
smaller than C p D" and the total profit cannot make good 
the loss. In such a case every member of the combination 
engages in business at a loss. 
On the other hand, during a period of prosperity the 
curve D D' becomes less concave and the length of that 
part of the line which D D' projects out. of the perpen· 
dicular line C e also becomes greater; the part D p extends 
downward less concavely; D p C' is greatly enlarged and 
can easily make up C p D" in that case; and its surplus 
(D p' C! minus C p D") can make up the loss (C p D" minus 
D pC'), which has been sustained during the former business 
depression or would be sustained in a future depression. 
Thus the members of a combination after all derive a be· 
nefit from the organization. 
Whether a combination secures a profit or otherwise, 
the profit or loss of each member of the combination will 
be proportional either to the profit or to the loss, because 
of the fact that a liner on the one and the same trip carries 
various kinds of cargoes each of which has a different 
capacity to bear freight charges, and therefore pays a 
different rate of freight. This proportional sharing of the 
profit or loss of a combination nears perfection when a pool 
is adopted by that combination . 
4. COMBINATIONS OF TRAMP·OWNERS FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF MONOPOLIZING 
A FREIGHT MARKET. 
The freight rates in the case of tramp shipping also 
vary with various kinds of cargoes, but this difference has 
no .direct bearing upon the freight·charge·bearing capacities 
of every cargo; it is rather due to the differences in the 
extra costs of the respective marine services. Tramps usual-
ly carry one kind of cargo from one port to another and do 
• 
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not carry many different kinds of cargo on one trip. Con-
sequently, that part of the cost of the marine service which 
remains after the extra cost above mentioned is subtracted 
-the basic cost, as it might be called-is practically the 
same for all cargoes; and the basic freight charge, which 
corresponds to the basic cost, is also practically the same 
for all cargoes, being regulated only by the law of supply 
and demand. For this reason it is impossible for one 
trampowner under competition to demand a higher freight 
rate for some kind of goods than others because of its 
high freight·charge-bearing capacity. 
The basic freight rate of tramp shipping is, therefore, 
usually fixed at a certain point, at the point p or r, for 
instance, at a certain time in a given shipping market, and 
goods which have smaller freight-charge-bearing capacity 
than that fixed rate will not be transported, while those 
which have larger bearing-capacity than that rate are carried 
with "consumers' surplus"; the word "consumers" means 
here "shippers." But in the case of liners, the freight rate 
is fixed according to the capacity of each goods to bear 
freight charges, and for this reason, on the one hand, even 
those goods which have smaller bearing·capacity than the 
cost of the marine service are carried at the expense of 
those which have larger bearing-capacity than the cost of 
the service, while, on the other hand, even those cargoes 
later mentioned are carried with not so much "consumers' 
surplus" as in the case of tramp shipping. 
In tramp shipping, though the vessels some times carry 
mixed freights, they usually carry one kind of commodity 
alone on one trip and the basic freight rate is only one for 
a single case. For this reason, in times of depression in 
the shipping world, those tramp-vessels whose laying-up 
points are higher than the freight rate are eventually forced 
to be laid uP,. as long as the circumstances of shippers 
remain unimproved. This is why the formation of a cartel 
which regulates freight rates by means of a combination is 
impossible in the case of tramp-shipping. Suppose a group 
. 
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of tramp·owners makes a freight-rate agreement and at· 
tempts to maintain it. It will be found in times of de-
pression, that if the freight rate is to be maintained, the 
amount of tonnage-supply will have to be restricted. Thus 
such a cartel after all amounts to nothing more than a com-
bination for the purpose of laying-up vessels, a topic which 
I have already taken up in this article, the result being 
that the number of laid-up vessels will be larger than the 
number when no check at all is placed on competiton. I 
shall refer to Figure 2 again. Whereas, the number of 
laid-up vessels under unrestricted competition is c e, it be-
comes b e which shows an increase of laid-up vessels by 
b c, if an attempt is made to raise the freight rate by an 
artificial means. This gives rise to the following phenomena. 
In the first place, the combination will have to put aside a 
large sum for subsidies for the laying·up of vessels. When, 
as a result of laying-up more vessels, the freight rate has 
risen to the profit-yielding point, tramp vessels owned by 
non-members of the combination will enter into competition, 
and this will surely endanger the safety of the combination 
itself. It is clear then that a combination of tramp·owners 
for the purpose of monopolizing a freight market becomes 
in times of continued business depression a combination for 
laying-up vessels; and an increase in the laying-up subsidies 
and the entry of out-siders into the field as competitors will 
tend to break up the combination. Thus, viewed from the 
standpoint of a freight theory, it is clear that, for tramp· 
owners, the formation of a cartel for the purpose of monopoliz-
ing a freight market is practically impossible, human nature 
being what it at present is! This is the reason why 
.. conferences" hold good only in the liner business, and 
not in the tramp business. 
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